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Paramountcy and Tobacco 
Peter W. Hogg* 
I. THE PARAMOUNTCY RULE 
A federal system has to have a rule to resolve conflicts between federal 
(national) laws and provincial (state) laws. Oddly enough, the need for 
such a rule escaped the framers of the British North America Act in 
1867, and they made no provision for conflicts between federal and 
provincial laws. It was left to the courts to invent the rule, and they 
decided that, in case of conflict between a federal and provincial law, 
the federal law is paramount.1 Obviously, the doctrine of paramountcy 
means that the provincial law must yield to the federal law to the extent 
of the conflict. But what exactly is the status of the provincial law? The 
answer is that the provincial law is not rendered invalid or ultra vires; 
nor is it repealed; it is rendered “inoperative”. The difference between 
“inoperative” and the alternatives is that the operation of the provincial 
law is suspended for as long as the conflicting federal law remains in 
force; if the federal law is repealed, the provincial law will 
automatically revive (come back into operation) without any re-
enactment by the provincial legislature.2  
It is the meaning of conflict or inconsistency (I treat these two terms 
as synonymous) that has proved most troublesome, and is the topic of 
this paper.  It is worth noting at the outset that the definition of conflict 
carries profound implications for the scope of federal review and for the 
balance of legislative power within the federation.  Given the overriding 
force of federal law, a wide definition of conflict will result in the defeat 
of provincial laws in “fields” that are “covered” by federal law. This is 
the course of judicial activism, because it leads to the striking down of 
provincial laws. In that sense, it favours central power. A narrow 
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definition of conflict, on the other hand, will allow provincial laws to 
survive so long as they do not “expressly contradict” a federal law. This 
is the course of judicial restraint, because it leaves provincial laws in 
place except where they give rise to unavoidable conflict. In that sense, 
it favours provincial power. 
II. COVERING THE FIELD 
The broadest definition of inconsistency is the covering-the-field (or 
negative implication) test, which was well articulated by Cartwright J. in 
O’Grady v. Sparling.3 In that case, the issue was whether a provincial 
highway traffic offence of driving carelessly (without due care and 
attention) was in conflict with the federal Criminal Code offence of 
driving recklessly. Justice Cartwright, dissenting, would have found the 
two laws to be in conflict. Here is how he described the test: 
In my opinion, when Parliament has expressed in an Act its decision 
that a certain kind or degree of negligence in the operation of a motor 
vehicle shall be punishable as a crime against the state it follows that it 
has decided that no less culpable kind or degree of negligence in such 
operation shall be so punishable. By necessary implication the Act 
says not only what kinds or degrees of negligence shall be punishable 
but also what kinds or degrees shall not.4 
The premise of this reasoning is that when Parliament enacted the 
Criminal Code offence of reckless driving, it intended to cover the field 
of negligent driving, and pre-empt any provincial law in the same field. 
In other words, the express terms of the Act carried a negative 
implication that there should be no provincial laws in the same field. 
Justice Cartwright’s opinion in O’Grady v. Sparling was a 
dissenting one. The majority of the Supreme Court, in an opinion 
written by Judson J., rejected the covering-the-field test, holding that 
“both provisions could live together and operate concurrently”.5 Other 
cases also rejected the covering-the-field test. Justice Cartwright 
dissented in two other cases decided at the same time. In Stephens v. 
The Queen,6 the majority of the Court held that there was no conflict 
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between the provincial highway traffic offence of failing to remain at 
the scene of an accident and the federal Criminal Code offence of 
failing to remain at the scene of an accident “with intent to escape civil 
or criminal liability”. In Smith v. The Queen,7 the majority of the Court 
held that there was no conflict between the provincial securities law 
offence of furnishing false information in a prospectus and the federal 
Criminal Code offence of making, circulating or publishing a false 
prospectus. Other cases decided in the 1960s and 1970s refused to find 
conflict when provincial laws were in the same field as federal laws, and 
even when the provincial laws were very similar to federal laws. Justice 
Cartwright himself, after dissenting in the three 1960 cases that I have 
just described, bowed to precedent and joined with the other members of 
the Court in rejecting the covering-the-field test in the later cases.8 
III. EXPRESS CONTRADICTION 
By 1982, it was clear that covering the field was not the test for 
determining whether there was conflict between a federal and a 
provincial law. But it was not at all clear what the actual test was. In 
contrast to Cartwright J.’s admirable clarity of definition, albeit in a lost 
cause, the majority opinions in the chain of cases through the 1960s and 
1970s mostly contented themselves with vague affirmations that laws 
could “live together” or could “co-exist” or were not in “direct conflict”, 
without clarifying what laws could not live together or could not co-
exist or would be in direct conflict. Only Martland J. articulated a test 
with some real traction. Writing one of the two concurring opinions that 
made up the majority in Smith v. The Queen, the false prospectus case 
mentioned earlier,9 he said that there was “no conflict in the sense that 
compliance with one law involves breach of the other”.10 The case 
where the provincial law could not be obeyed except by breaking the 
federal law was an “express contradiction”. On any view of the law, that 
had to be a conflict that triggered paramountcy. But was it the only case 
of conflict? 
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In Multiple Access v. McCutcheon,11 Dickson J., writing for a 
majority of the Supreme Court, brought his sharp mind to bear on the 
question. The issue in the case was whether there was conflict between 
the insider trading provisions of Ontario’s securities law and the 
virtually identical provisions of federal corporation law. Despite the 
duplication, Dickson J. held that there was no conflict. Indeed, he 
pointed out that duplication was the “ultimate in harmony”. He cited 
Martland J.’s dictum in Smith with approval,12 and went on to hold that: 
In principle, there would seem to be no good reasons to speak of 
paramountcy and preclusion except where there is actual conflict in 
operation as where one enactment says “yes” and the other says “no”; 
“the same citizens are being told to do inconsistent things”; 
compliance with one is defiance of the other.13 
This was a rather clear statement that only an express contradiction 
between two laws — where “compliance with one is defiance of the 
other”— would suffice to trigger the paramountcy doctrine. This was a 
very tight restriction on the paramountcy doctrine, since cases where the 
provincial law expressly contradicts the federal law are few and far 
between.14 
Multiple Access was followed in the Spraytech case.15 The issue in 
that case was whether the Town of Hudson had the power to enact a by-
law severely restricting the use of pesticides in the town. The 
paramountcy issue arose because the pesticides, the use of which was 
prohibited throughout much of the town, satisfied federal standards that 
had been enacted to regulate the importation, manufacture, sale and 
distribution of pesticides in Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada held 
that the federal legislation was only permissive. It permitted, but did not 
require, the use of the federally-approved pesticides. The by-law’s 
prohibition of the use of pesticides did not create an “operational 
conflict” with the federal law; compliance with the by-law (by not using 
pesticides) would not entail a breach of the federal law.16 And, to 
anticipate the next section of the article, it could not be said that the  
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by-law frustrated the purpose of the federal law. It was not the intention 
of the federal law to “grant a blanket authority to pesticides’ 
manufacturers or distributors to spread them on every spot of greenery 
within Canada”.17 
IV. FRUSTRATION OF FEDERAL PURPOSE 
Multiple Access seemed to have settled the law of paramountcy by 
adopting the express contradiction test for conflict. However, in Bank of 
Montreal v. Hall,18 the Supreme Court unexpectedly held that the 
doctrine of paramountcy rendered inoperative a provincial law that 
required a creditor to give notice to a defaulting debtor, giving the 
debtor a last opportunity to repay the loan, before bringing proceedings 
for foreclosure (to seize and sell the security for the loan). The conflict 
was with the federal Bank Act,19 which provided a procedure for 
foreclosure by a bank that did not include the giving of this last-
opportunity notice to the debtor. This was not a case of express 
contradiction. If the bank had served the notice required by provincial 
law, it would not have been in breach of the Bank Act. The sole effect 
would have been to delay the bank in realizing its security. But La 
Forest J., writing for the Court, claimed that there was an “actual 
conflict in operation” and that “compliance with the federal statute 
necessarily entails defiance of its provincial counterpart”. Although the 
decision was framed in the language of express contradiction, the 
holding that the provincial law was inoperative seemed to depend on 
something very like the old covering-the-field test. The Bank Act had 
enacted a complete code with respect to enforcement of bank loans, and 
supplemental provincial law had to yield to that code. An alternative 
way of looking at the case was that it depended on a judicial finding that 
the purpose of the Bank Act would be frustrated if the bank had to 
comply with the provincial law. 
The latter explanation was accepted and applied in Law Society of 
B.C. v. Mangat.20 In that case, the provincial Legal Profession Act21 
required that only lawyers could appear as counsel before administrative 
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tribunals and boards (including those established under federal law). 
The federal Immigration Act22 provided that, in proceedings before the 
Immigration and Refugee Board a party could be represented by a non-
lawyer. Once again, there was no express contradiction, since a person 
appearing before the board could comply with both laws by retaining a 
lawyer. However, the Supreme Court, speaking through Gonthier J., 
pointed out that the purpose of the Immigration Act provision was to 
provide an informal, accessible and speedy process, in which parties 
could be represented by agents who spoke their language, understood 
their culture and were inexpensive. That purpose would often be 
defeated if only lawyers were permitted to appear before the board. 
Justice Gonthier held that compliance with the provincial law “would go 
contrary to Parliament’s purpose in enacting [the representation 
provisions] of the Immigration Act”.23 In that sense, there was a conflict 
in operation between the provincial and the federal law. For that reason, 
the Court held that the provincial law was inoperative in its application 
to proceedings before the Immigration and Refugee Protection Board.  
As the result of the Bank of Montreal and Mangat cases, it is clear 
that Canadian courts now accept a second case of inconsistency, 
namely, where a provincial law would frustrate the purpose of a federal 
law. Where there are overlapping federal and provincial laws, and it is 
possible to comply with both laws, but the effect of the provincial law 
would be to frustrate the purpose of the federal law, that is also a case of 
inconsistency. In deference to Multiple Access, the Court seems to 
regard the frustration-of-federal-purpose test as a subset of express 
contradiction, although it is much less “express” than the impossibility 
of dual compliance. The new test requires the courts to interpret the 
federal law to determine what the federal purpose is, and then to 
determine whether the provincial law would have the effect of 
frustrating the federal purpose. If the answer is yes, then paramountcy 
renders the provincial law inoperative. 
The latest news at the level of the Supreme Court of Canada — and 
the reason for the word “tobacco” in the title to this article — is 
Rothmans, Benson & Hedges v. Saskatchewan.24 In that case, the federal 
Tobacco Act25 prohibited the promotion of tobacco products, except as 
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authorized elsewhere in the Act, and the Act went on to provide that “a 
person may display, at retail, a tobacco product”. The Saskatchewan 
Tobacco Control Act26 banned the display of tobacco products in any 
premises in which persons under 18 years of age were permitted. The 
Supreme Court of Canada, speaking through Major J., interpreted the 
federal permission to display as intended to circumscribe the prohibition 
on promotion, and not to create a positive “entitlement” to display. That 
meant that a retailer could comply with both laws, either by refusing to 
admit persons under 18 or by not displaying tobacco products. But what 
about the frustration of the federal purpose? Did not the express 
permission to display indicate a federal purpose to allow retailers to 
display tobacco products? No, answered the Court. Both the general 
purpose of the Tobacco Act (which was “to address a national health 
problem”) and the specific purpose of the permission to display (which 
was “to circumscribe the Tobacco Act’s general prohibition on 
promotion”) “remain fulfilled”.27 
With respect, there is much to be said on the other side of this issue. 
Parliament did, no doubt, recognize a national health problem, but it 
chose to “regulate” tobacco use only by restricting Charter-protected 
commercial expression. Parliament had to do that within the reasonable 
limits allowed by section 1 of the Charter of Rights. Indeed, the 
previous version of the Act had been struck down as an unreasonable 
limit on freedom of expression.28 The express permission to retailers to 
display the product was an effort to impose a reasonable limit on the 
prohibition of commercial speech about a product that retailers were 
lawfully entitled to sell. By narrowing the federal limit on the 
prohibition of commercial speech, the provincial law arguably frustrated 
an important general purpose of the federal Act, which was to comply 
with the Charter of Rights.29 And, having regard to the impracticality of 
excluding persons under 18 from the supermarkets, convenience stores, 
news stands, gas stations and other retail outlets where cigarettes are 
sold, the provincial law surely frustrated the specific purpose of the 
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explicit permission to display. The Court, however, decided otherwise, 
holding that the provincial law did not frustrate the purpose of the 
federal law, and, therefore, was not rendered inoperative by 
paramountcy. The Court acknowledged that it was influenced30 by the 
curious decision of the Attorney General of Canada (normally so careful 
to protect federal turf) to intervene in the litigation on the side of the 
province, despite the fact that the provincial law undermined a federal 
law that expressly granted permission to display tobacco products at 
retail. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the recent cases that the Supreme Court of Canada does 
not infer an inconsistency between federal and provincial laws based on 
an imputation that federal law “covers the field” or carries a “negative 
implication” forbidding supplementary provincial law in the same field. 
However, as we noted earlier, the Court will infer an inconsistency 
where it concludes that a federal law has a purpose that would be 
frustrated by a provincial law. Cases where the provincial law frustrates 
the purpose of a federal law are not easily distinguishable from the old 
covering-the-field test, since they interpret the federal law as implicitly 
intending to foreclose at least some kinds of supplementary provincial 
law. The Court has to make a judgment as to whether the two laws can 
indeed live together, bearing in mind not just the compatibility of the 
provincial law with the literal requirements of the federal law, but also 
the compatibility of the provincial law with the purpose of the federal 
law. Because there is no objective way of ascertaining the purpose of a 
particular federal law, and no objective way of determining whether a 
provincial law would frustrate that purpose, the decisions have become 
highly unpredictable.  
The clarity of the Multiple Access ruling that only an express 
contradiction will serve as a conflict for the purpose of triggering 
federal paramountcy has been completely lost. Of course, clarity is not 
the only value served by rules of constitutional law, and it may be that 
express contradiction was simply too narrow a definition to recognize 
all the varieties of conflict that really did have the effect of derogating 
from a federal law. In particular, the Mangat case illustrates why 
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express contradiction is too narrow a test. In that case, the provincial 
law requiring only lawyers to appear before federal boards would have 
seriously undermined the goals of the federal law permitting non-
lawyers to appear before the Immigration and Refugee Board, even 
though compliance with the provincial law (by hiring a lawyer) would 
not have caused a breach of the federal law. The Bank of Montreal case 
is much less clear, and the reasoning is not to be found in the judicial 
opinion. But it is arguable that requiring banks to comply with 
provincial rules respecting foreclosure would frustrate the purpose of 
the federal Bank Act’s regulation of the process. In the Rothmans case, 
the federal law’s express permission to retailers to display tobacco 
products seemed, at the very least, to indicate a federal purpose to allow 
display (as a reasonable limit on freedom of expression), and yet the 
Court held that severe provincial restrictions on display did not frustrate 
the purpose. Obviously, the courts retain a lot of discretion in deciding 
these cases, and it may be that the Court in Rothmans was reluctant to 
interfere with provincial efforts to limit tobacco use. 
The Supreme Court will have another opportunity to examine the 
paramountcy doctrine, when it decides the appeal from the decision of 
the Alberta Court of Appeal in Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta.31 At 
issue here is whether the province of Alberta may impose on the banks a 
licensing regime for the promotion of creditors’ insurance to the banks’ 
customers. The federal Bank Act and regulations under the Act permit 
the banks to promote the sale of certain defined types of “insurance” to 
their customers. The insurance is mostly of the kind in which the bank is 
the beneficiary, and the proceeds would pay off a bank loan in the event 
of (for example) the death, disability or loss of employment of the 
debtor. The effect of the Alberta regulation is to impose a layer of 
provincial regulation on the promotion of Bank-Act-authorized 
insurance by the banks. The sanction for non-compliance with the 
Alberta law is the denial of a licence to a bank to promote authorized 
insurance in the province. Does this frustrate the purpose of the Bank 
Act’s authorization of the promotion of insurance by the banks? The 
Alberta Court of Appeal said no, leaving the banks to comply with the 
provincial licensing requirements on pain of losing their power to 
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promote insurance in the province.32 The Supreme Court of Canada 
heard the appeal on April 11, 2006, and has not yet (as of August 1, 
2006) rendered a judgment. 
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